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(http://www.adb.org/Water/Policy/consultations/IND-2005-Consultation-Report.pdf#page=3). Tariffs based on volume are interesting, but metering is a problem and costly. Customer involvement in the process is very important. China’s Rural Water Supply program has over 90 % payment compliance in households with metered systems whereby the salaries of the operations staff are tied to monthly bill collection and raising tariffs if they do not cover operating costs
(http://www.wsp.org/publications/global_wtp_china.pdf). Cross subsidies has high potential particularly for poor slum dwellers
Differential tariffs in sewered systems charging below cost to poor users and above cost to others
Good approach in relation to differences in income provided total system cost are recovered which at present is often not the case. Also, it is difficult to ensure that subsidies reach the poorest groups (http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/waterandsanitation/funding/estab-price-policy.html ; http://www.sanicon.net/themes/intro.php3?theme=3). High potential for connecting more people but costly and may reduce interest for dry alternatives
== Micro credit for private sector ==
(http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/10/25/000094946_
02101104032679/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf ). High potential because the part of the sector funds that are currently lost can be used for service improvement and expansion
Increased transparency will allow more efficient use of available funding
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon and drains part of the funding that could be used to reduce costs to consumers, including the poor, to increase salaries, improve planning and the quality of construction. Better procedures and access to information are needed.
(http://www.irc.nl/content/download/21439/253860/file/How%20to%20hold%20a%20meeting%20tool%20(Stockholm).pdf ). A study comparing productivity among 21 water utilities in Africa found that nearly two-thirds of their operating costs were due to corruption
( http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/10/25/
000094946_02101104032679/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf ). High potential because the part of the sector funds that are currently lost can be used for service improvement and expansion
Experience with OBA is new, but growing and interesting. The difference with other subsidies is that OBAs are targeted for example to the poorest families (Cambodia) or to the poorest neighbourhoods (Paraguay) clarifying why subsidy is given and they are performance-based. The provider largely self-finances the service, receiving reimbursement mostly after the verification of successful delivery. The latter may reduce possibilities for small providers with limited capital. A bonus-malus approach might be more feasible, perhaps linked to longer-term system performance. (http://www.gpoba.org/documents/OBApproaches_What_is_OBA.pdf).
OBA uses explicit performance-based subsidies to support the delivery of basic services where it is justified using public funding to complement or replace user-fees.
The core of the OBA approach is the contracting out of service delivery to a third party, usually a private firm, where payment of public funds is tied to the actual delivery of these services. The Global Partnership for OBA is supporting programmes in different regions and sectors, including working with SSPs for on-site sanitation in Dakar and utilities in Punjab ( http://www.gpoba.org ).
== Partial Subsidies in latrine programmes ==